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La población del mundo está envejeciendo y empujando a muchos países a un largo período de gran 
tensión fiscal. En algunos, los impuestos por sí solos no alcanzarán o no serán destinados a financiar 
todos los gastos proyectados en pago de pensiones y gastos de salud. Si los agentes económicos 
asignan una probabilidad suficiente a que la economía llegará a su “límite fiscal” en algún momento 
futuro, pasado el cual no aumentará sus ingresos tributarios, puede que nunca más una política 
monetaria “buena” —que se rija por el principio de Taylor— sea capaz de controlar la inflación o 
anclar las expectativas inflacionarias. En el período conducente a dicho límite fiscal, mientras más 
agresiva sea la forma en que la política monetaria vaya en contra de los fundamentos inflacionarios, 
más se alejará la inflación esperada de la meta de inflación. Los problemas que enfrenta la política 
monetaria se agravan cuando las instituciones pertinentes no especifican sus objetivos y metas 
fiscales y, por tanto, no anclan las expectativas. El presente documento contrasta, a la luz de esta 





Slow moving demographics are aging populations around the world and pushing many countries 
into an extended period of heightened fiscal stress. In some countries, taxes alone cannot or likely 
will not fully fund projected pension and health care expenditures. If economic agents place 
sufficient probability on the economy hitting its ”fiscal limit” at some point in the future, after 
which further tax revenues are not forthcoming, it may no longer be possible for “good” monetary 
policy—behavior that obeys the Taylor principle—to control inflation or anchor inflation 
expectations. In the period leading up to the fiscal limit, the more aggressively that monetary policy 
leans against inflationary winds, the more expected inflation becomes unhinged from the inflation 
target. Problems confronting monetary policy are exacerbated when policy institutions leave fiscal 
objectives and targets unspecified and, therefore, fiscal expectations unanchored. In light of this 
theory, the paper contrasts monetary-fiscal policy frameworks in the United States and Chile. 
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Policymakers have long understood that if fiscal policy runs amuck and monetary policy is forced 
to raise seigniorage revenues, big inflations result. Latin American policymakers understand this 
outcome better than most. This message is implicit in Cagan’s (1956) initial study of hyperinflation, 
and the message is explicit in Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) theoretical analysis of how monetary 
policy can lose control of inflation and in Sargent’s (1983) interpretation of historical episodes of high 
inflations. The message is forcefully promulgated by international economic organizations that 
prescribe policy reforms to troubled economies. Underlying this view is the notion that if central 
bankers display sufficient resolve and stick to their inflation-fighting guns, fiscal policy will 
eventually relent and reform. Unfortunately, wishing it were so does not make it so. 
Recent research on monetary and fiscal policies has shown that the ways in which policies 
interact to determine inflation and influence the real economy are far more subtle than the 
“monetization of debt” perspective implies. For example, Sargent and Wallace (1975) find that if the 
central bank pegs the nominal interest rate—or, more generally, does not adjust the rate strongly 
with inflation—then the equilibrium inflation rate is undetermined, but this finding is not robust to 
alternative assumptions about fiscal behavior: Leeper (1991) and others have shown that if primary 
surpluses are unresponsive to the state of government debt, then inflation is uniquely determined. 
This is not merely of academic interest. Central banks do go through periods when they adjust 
interest rates weakly to inflation, and many banks are now, in effect, pegging the nominal rate near 
the zero lower bound. If such behavior endangered price stability by not pinning down the inflation 
process, this would be of great practical concern. 
Another example that has received much attention is that when a government issues nominal 
debt denominated in its home currency, fluctuations in current or expected primary surpluses can 
generate important aggregate demand effects. 1  Policies that set the nominal interest rate 
independently of inflation and primary surpluses independently of outstanding debt represent the 
canonical case in which a debt-financed tax cut today, which does not carry with it an expectation of 
higher taxes in the future, raises household wealth and increases aggregate demand. In the standard 
models used for policy analysis, higher demand raises both output and inflation; higher inflation 
then serves to revalue outstanding nominal debt. Debt revaluation can be an important source of 
fiscal financing by ensuring that this mix of policies is sustainable. 
This canonical case also points to circumstances in which monetary policy can no longer control 
inflation. Some observers dismiss the case as special, preferring to stick to the convention that fiscal 
policy is Ricardian in the sense that expansions in debt are always backed by higher expected 
primary surpluses (McCallum, 2001). Unfortunately, demographic, political, and economics realities 
in many countries may not conform to this conventional view. 
Within the class of new Keynesian models now in wide use for monetary policy analysis, 
something of a consensus has developed around what constitutes “good” monetary policy behavior. In 
terms of implementable simple rules—as opposed to, say, Ramsey optimal solutions—a necessary 
condition is that the central bank adjust the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with 
inflation; this is called the Taylor principle (Taylor, 1993). This principle seems to produce nearly 
optimal outcomes in models now in use at central banks.2  
In this paper, I explore how the Taylor principle characterization of “good” monetary policy fares 
in periods of heightened fiscal stress. Fiscal stress is what Chile, the United States, much of Europe, 
Japan, and a great many other countries are facing in the coming decades as their populations age 
and government transfer payments for pensions and health care are anticipated to rise substantially 
as a share of GDP. It is unlikely that tax revenues alone can finance these promised transfers. Some 
countries are already at or near the peaks of their Laffer curves, according to some estimates 
                                                       
1. The list of contributors to this literature is long, but some key papers include Leeper (1991, 1993), Woodford (1994, 
1995), Sims (1994, 2005), Cochrane (1999, 2001), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2000), Daniel 
(2001), and Corsetti and Mackowiak (2006).  
2. See, for example, Henderson and McKibbin (1993), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2007), and Taylor (1999b).  
  1(Trabandt and Uhlig, 2009). In those countries, it may be economically impossible to raise sufficient 
revenues. Other countries, such as the United States, seem to have little tolerance for high tax rates 
and may find it politically impossible to raise taxes enough. In either scenario, these countries could 
easily reach their fiscal limits well before the generational storm—in Kotlikoff and Burns’s (2004) 
memorable phrase—has fully played out. At its fiscal limit, a government can no longer follow the 
conventional prescription by which fiscal policy takes care of itself (and everything else that affects 
the value of government debt) by financing government debt entirely through future surpluses. By 
extension, the fiscal limit makes it infeasible for monetary policy to always obey the Taylor principle, 
for doing so results in unsustainable policies. 
At the fiscal limit, macroeconomic policies enter a new realm that economists have only begun to 
study systematically. Once taxes can no longer adjust and government purchases have achieved 
their socially acceptable lower bound, only two sources of fiscal financing remain: incomplete 
honoring of promised transfers and surprise revaluations of outstanding nominal government bonds 
(or some combination of the two).3 The first option would permit monetary policy to continue to 
follow a Taylor principle because, in effect, actual transfers are adjusting to finance government 
debt. However, the same demographics that are behind the growing transfer payments also create 
powerful political pressures for democratic governments to honor their earlier promises. The second 
option allows the government to fully honor its financial commitments, but requires the central bank 
to give up control of inflation. A more likely outcome is some mix of the two options, possibly with 
policy fluctuating between the two distinct monetary-fiscal regimes. With the mixed outcome, 
monetary policy would still lose control of inflation, as Davig and Leeper (2006b, 2009), Chung, 
Davig, and Leeper (2007), and Davig, Leeper, and Walker (forthcoming) show. 
No government has made it completely clear to its populace how the coming fiscal storm will be 
weathered. Existing rules governing fiscal behavior, where they exist, are not obviously robust to an 
environment in which government transfers constitute a growing fraction of GDP. And how such 
fiscal rules interact with, say, an inflation-targeting monetary policy is not well understood. Some 
large countries, like Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, seem to have made no 
provisions whatsoever for dealing with future fiscal stresses. In those countries, the public has no 
choice but to speculate about how future policies will adjust. Can expectations of inflation and 
interest rates be anchored by monetary policy in this new policy realm? What will determine such 
expectations, if not monetary policy? How does the public’s speculation about future policy 
adjustments affect the equilibrium today? 
There is much ballyhoo about how a major benefit of having central banks adopt an explicit 
inflation target is that it contributes in important ways to anchoring private expectations of 
inflation. There are as many definitions of anchoring expectations as there are people repeating the 
mantra. Faust and Henderson (2004) grapple with the definition in their thoughtful piece about 
best-practice monetary policy. Many of their concerns spring from the fact that central banks—even 
inflation targeters—have multiple objectives and face trade-offs among those objectives. For the 
purposes of this paper, I simplify the problem by positing that the central bank targets only inflation 
at 
* π  and the tax authority targets only government debt at  . Faust and Henderson correctly 
observe that if the primary objective of inflation targeting is to anchor long-run expectations of 
inflation, then formally this amounts to ensuring that 
* b
tt
* lim j j Eπ π
→∞ + = . But by this definition of 
anchoring, as Faust and Henderson point out, best-practice monetary policy permits 
0 tt + j Eππ ε
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 for all  : at times, expected inflation over any forecast horizon will be very 
far from target. 
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3. I take off the table two other options: sovereign debt default and pure inflation taxes. It is difficult to imagine an 
equilibrium in which many large countries default simultaneously, though this possibility deserves further research. Pure 
inflation taxes are removed on the grounds that historical experience with hyperinflations has found them to be an 
extraordinarily costly means of fiscal financing. Moreover, like income taxes, inflation taxes are also subject to a Laffer curve 
and, therefore, a fiscal limit. 
  2No inflation-targeting central bank embraces such a liberal definition of anchoring expectations. 
The Central Bank of Chile aims “to keep annual CPI inflation around 3 percent most of the time” 
(Central Bank of Chile, 2007). Sveriges Riksbank targets 2 percent in Sweden (Sveriges Riksbank, 
2008). Both Chile and Sweden have a tolerance range of plus or minus 1 percentage point. In New 
Zealand, the Reserve Bank targets CPI inflation between 1 and 3 percent (Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, 2008). It is not apparent from their web pages, but I imagine that all inflation-targeting 
central banks would interpret “long run” to be something shy of infinity. I also imagine that if in 
those economies expected inflation could drift arbitrarily far from target for arbitrarily long periods, 
the central banks would not feel that they have successfully anchored long-run inflation expectations 
(even if one could prove that the Faust-Henderson limiting condition for expected inflation held). 
Analogous ranges tend to be applied in ministries of finance and treasuries that have an explicit 
target for government debt (see, for example, New Zealand Treasury, 2009; Swedish Ministry of 
Finance, 2008). 
In this paper I adopt the more pragmatic notion of anchored expectations that policy authorities 
seem to apply. If in an equilibrium, expectations of a policy target variable can deviate widely from 
target for an extended period, then expectations are not well anchored on the announced targets. 
Formal theory helps to understand how monetary and fiscal policies interact to determine 
inflation. I lay out three very simple theoretical models to make concrete the issues that arise in an 
environment where taxes have reached their limit, but government transfers grow relentlessly. The 
theory suggests that even if economic agents know how policies will adjust once the economy hits the 
fiscal limit, it may no longer be possible for monetary policy to achieve its inflation target.4 Monetary 
policy’s loss of control of inflation begins well before the fiscal limit is hit. Because agents know such 
a limit exists, monetary policy cannot control inflation even in the period leading up to the limit, 
when monetary policy dutifully follows the Taylor principle and fiscal policy systematically raises 
taxes to stabilize debt. 
The central bank’s problems controlling inflation become more profound in the arguably more 
plausible environment where agents are uncertain about how monetary and fiscal policies will adjust 
in the future once the fiscal limit is reached. In such a setting it is easy to see how expectations can 
become unanchored, particularly if monetary and fiscal authorities do little to help resolve 
uncertainty about future policies. 
Policy uncertainty almost certainly reduces welfare. Existing work tends to model the 
uncertainty in rather stylized forms—a stochastic capital tax, for example—but nonetheless finds 
that greater uncertainty reduces growth and welfare (Hopenhayn, 1996; Aizenman and Marion, 
1993). Uncertainty can also generate an option value for waiting to investment, which slows growth 
(Bernanke, 1983; Dixit, 1989; Pindyck, 1988). Indeed, one argument for having central banks 
announce their intended interest rate paths is to reduce uncertainty about monetary policy, which 
better anchors expectations and improves the effectiveness of monetary policy (Faust and Leeper, 
2005; Rudebusch and Williams, 2006; Svensson, 2006). While the implications of uncertainty for 
welfare are important, I do not pursue them in the positive analysis that follows. 
One interpretation of policy uncertainty is in the context of imperfectly credible macroeconomic 
policies, an application that has been used extensively to analyze policy reforms in developing 
countries (see, for example, Calvo and Végh, 1993, 1999; Buffie and Atolia, 2007; Calvo, 2007). In 
that literature, policy uncertainty takes the form of temporary stabilizations, which are 
implemented, but whose duration is uncertain and, therefore, not credible. Lack of credibility has 
similar consequences to the presence of a fiscal limit, in that it can undermine the efficacy even of 
“good” policies. 
In light of the profound policy uncertainty that many countries will soon face, I find myself in 
sympathy with North (1990, p. 83): “The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce 
uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction. 
                                                       
4. Sims (2005) makes closely related points in the context of inflation targeting. Sims (2009) explains that as an 
application of Wallace’s (1981) Modigliani-Miller theorem for open market operations, many of the extraordinary measures 
that central banks have taken over the past year or so run the risk of being insufficiently backed by fiscal policy and, 
therefore, may make it difficult for monetary policy alone to anchor inflation. 
  3The overall stability of an institutional framework makes complex exchange possible across both 
time and space.” Only the policy institutions themselves— via the desires of the electorate—can help 
to resolve the uncertainty, and only by reducing uncertainty can policy institutions hope to anchor 
expectations reliably. 
After deriving theoretical results, the paper compares the monetary-fiscal policy frameworks in 
Chile and the United States. These countries provide interesting contrasts: whereas Chile has 
adopted specific objectives and even rules for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy, the United 
States has consistently eschewed rules-based policies. Chile’s policies contribute toward keeping the 
economy well away from the fiscal limit, permitting the Central Bank of Chile to target inflation and 
anchor inflation expectations. Chile’s policy reforms have made it a leader among emerging 
economies. In the United States, agents have good reason to be concerned that taxes may reach the 
fiscal limit, undermining the Federal Reserve’s ability to control inflation now and in the future. 
Perhaps policymakers in the United States and other major economies can learn from the 
macroeconomic policy reforms adopted by emerging economies. 
 
 
1. THREE SIMPLE MODELS 
 
I present three models of price-level and inflation determination that increase in the subtlety of 
the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies. Throughout the analysis I restrict attention to 
rational expectations equilibria, so the results I present can be readily contrasted to prevailing 
views, which also are based on rational expectations. The first model draws from Leeper (1991), Sims 
(1994), and Woodford (2001) to lay the groundwork for how monetary and fiscal policies jointly 
determine equilibrium. These results are well known, but the broader implications of thinking about 
macroeconomic policies jointly are not fully appreciated. A second model adds one layer of subtlety 
by positing that at some known date in the future, call it T, the economy will reach its fiscal limit, at 
which point it is not possible to raise further revenues. At that limit, the policy regime—the mix of 
monetary and fiscal rules—changes in some known way. This model illustrates how expectations of 
future policies can feed back to affect the current equilibrium. The final model adds one more layer of 
subtlety: although agents know the regime will change at date T, they are uncertain what mix of 
monetary and fiscal policies will be realized. In this model, agents’ expectations of inflation depend 
on the subjective probabilities they attach to possible future policies. The last two models draw on 
work in Davig, Leeper, and Walker (forthcoming). The models illustrate how interactions between 
monetary and fiscal policies, the possibility of regime changes, and uncertainty about future regimes 
create difficulties for policy authorities who aim to anchor private expectations on the targets of 
policy. 
Each model has a common specification of the behavior of the private sector. An infinitely lived 
representative household is endowed each period with a constant quantity of nonstorable goods, y. 
To keep the focus away from seigniorage considerations, I examine a cashless economy, which can be 
obtained by making the role of fiat currency infinitesimally small. Government issues nominal one-
period bonds, so the price level, P, can be  defined as the rate at which bonds exchange for goods. 










E uc ,  (1) 
 
where  , subject to the budget constraint  <β< 01
 









  4taking prices and R as given. The household pays taxes,  −− > 110 B   τt , a d receives transfers,  t z , ea  
period, both of which are lump sum. 
n ch
Government spending is zero each period, so the government chooses sequences of taxes, 
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The exogenous (fixed) gross real interest rate, 1/β, makes the analysis easier, but it is not without 
some loss of generality, as Davig, Leeper, and Walker (forthcoming) show in the context of fiscal 
financing in a model with nominal rigidities. This is less the case in a small open economy, so one 
interpretation of this model is that it is a small open economy in which government debt is 
denominated in terms of the home nominal bonds (“currency”), and all debt is held by domestic 
agents. 
 
1.1 Model 1  
 
I begin with simple fixed policy regimes in order to solidify the understanding of how monetary 
and fiscal policies jointly determine the equilibrium price level and inflation rate. The focus on price-
level determination is entirely for analytical convenience; it is not a statement that inflation is the 
only thing that macroeconomic policy authorities do or should care about. Because price-level 
determination is the first step toward understanding how macroeconomic policies affect the 
aggregate economies, the key insights I derive from this model extend to more complex 
environments. 
 
1.1.1 Active monetary/passive tax policy  
 
This model reiterates well-known results about how inflation is determined in the canonical 
model of monetary policy, as presented in textbooks by Galí (2008) and Woodford (2003), for example. 
This regime—denoted active monetary and passive fiscal policy—combines an interest rate rule in 
which the central bank aggressively adjusts the nominal rate in response to current inflation with a 
tax rule in which the tax authority adjusts taxes in response to government debt sufficiently to 
stabilize debt.5 In this textbook, best-of-all-possible worlds, monetary policy can consistently hit its 
inflation target, and fiscal policy can achieve its target for the real value of debt. 
To derive the equilibrium price level for the model laid out above, we need to specify rules for 
monetary, tax, and transfer policies. Monetary policy follows a conventional interest rate rule, which, 
for analytical convenience, is written somewhat unconventionally in terms of the inverse of the 
nominal interest and inflation rates: 
                                                       
5. Applying Leeper’s (1991) definitions, active monetary policy targets inflation, while passive monetary policy weakly 
adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to inflation; active tax policy sets the tax rate independently of government debt, 
and passive tax policy changes rates strongly enough when debt rises to stabilize the debt-GDP ratio; active transfer policy 
makes realized transfers equal promised transfers, while passive transfer policy allows realized transfers to be less than 
promised. 
  5 
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where α> ,   is the inflation target, and  β 1/
∗ π = πβ
** / R  is the steady-state nominal interest rate. 
The condition on the policy parameter α ensures that monetary policy is sufficiently hawkish in 
response to fluctuations in inflation that it can stabilize inflation around π
* . Fiscal policy adjusts 
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where  ,   is the debt target,  γ> = β− 1/ 1 r
* b τ
* is the steady state level of taxes, and   is 
the net real interest rate. Imposing the condition that γ exceeds the net real interest rate guarantees 
that any increase in government debt creates an expectation that future taxes will rise by enough to 
both service the higher debt and retire it back to  . 
=β − 1/ 1 r
* b
For now, I assume that government transfers evolve exogenously according to the following 
stochastic process: 
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where  ,  is steady-state transfers, and  <ρ< 01
* z εt is a serially uncorrelated shock with  + ε = 1 0 tt E . 





















Aggressive reactions of monetary policy to inflation imply that β α< /1
                                                     
, and the unique bounded 




t .  (9) 
 
Equilibrium inflation is therefore always on target, as is expected inflation.6 
If monetary policy determines inflation—and the path of the price level,{ —how must fiscal 
policy respond to disturbances in transfers to ensure that policy is sustainable? This is where passive 
tax adjustments step in. Substituting the tax rule (equation 6) into the government’s budget 
} t P
 
6. As Cochrane (2007) emphasizes, echoing Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), there is actually a continuum of explosive 
solutions to equation (8), each one associated with the central bank threatening to drive inflation to positive or negative 
infinity if the private sector’s expectations are not anchored on π*. Cochrane uses this logic to argue that fundamentally only 
fiscal policy can uniquely determine inflation. Pure theory cannot guide us to the unique solution in equation (9), but common 
sense can. Suppose that equation (5) is not a complete description of policy behavior in all states of the world and that there is 
a component to policy that says if the economy goes off on an explosive path, monetary policy will change its behavior 
appropriately to push the economy back to π*. If that extra component of policy is credible, agents will know that long-run 
expectations of inflation other than π* are inconsistent with equilibrium and, therefore, cannot be rational expectations. In 
this paper, I sidestep this dispute and simply accept the conventional assertion that we are interested in the unique bounded 
solution in equation (9). 
  6constraint (equation 3), taking expectations conditional on information at t – 1, and employing the 
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Because  , higher debt brings forth the expectation of higher taxes, so equation (10) 
describes how debt is expected to return to steady state following a shock to z
− β− γ <
1 1
ε≡ 0
t. In a steady state in 
which  , debt is  , equal to the present value of primary surpluses.  t
− =τ− β −
** * 1 () / ( bz 1 )
t
Another perspective on the fiscal financing requirements when monetary policy is targeting 
inflation emerges from a ubiquitous equilibrium condition. In any dynamic model with rational 
agents, government debt derives its value from its anticipated backing. In this model, that 
anticipated backing comes from tax revenues net of transfer payments, τ− . The value of 
government debt can be obtained by imposing equilibrium on the government’s flow constraint, 
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This intertemporal equilibrium condition (IEC) provides a new perspective on the crux of passive tax 
policy. Because   is nailed down by monetary policy and  t P
∞
+ =1 {} tjj z  is being set independently of both 
monetary and tax policies, any increase in transfers at t, which is financed by new sales of  t B , must 
generate an expectation that taxes will rise in the future by exactly enough to support the higher 
value of  / tt B P . 
In this model, the only potential source of an expansion in debt is disturbances to transfers. But 
passive tax policy implies that this pattern of fiscal adjustment must occur regardless of the reason 
that  t B  increases, whether it be economic downturns that automatically reduce taxes and raise 
transfers, changes in household portfolio behavior, changes in government spending, or central bank 
open market operations. To expand on the last example, we could modify this model to include 
money to allow us to imagine that the central bank decides to tighten monetary policy exogenously 
at t by conducting an open market sale of bonds. If monetary policy is active, then the monetary 
contraction both raises  t B —bonds held by households— and lowers  t ; real debt rises from both 
effects. This can be an equilibrium only if fiscal policy is expected to support it by passively raising 
future tax revenues. That is, given active monetary policy, IEC imposes restrictions on the class of 
tax policies that is consistent with equilibrium; those policies are labeled passive because the tax 
authority has limited discretion in choosing policy. Refusal by tax policy to adjust appropriately 
undermines the ability of open market operations to affect inflation in the conventional manner.
P
7 
A policy regime in which monetary policy is active and tax policy is passive produces the 
conventional outcome that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, and a 
hawkish central bank can successfully anchor actual and expected inflation at the inflation target. 
Tax policy must support the active monetary behavior by passively adjusting taxes to finance 
disturbances to government debt—from whatever source, including monetary policy—and ensure 
that policy is sustainable. 
                                                       
7. This is an application of the general insight contained in Wallace (1981). Sargent and Wallace’s “unpleasant 
monetarist arithmetic” (1981) outcome emerges because the tax authority refuses to respond “appropriately,” forcing 
monetary policy in the future to abandon its inflation target. Tobin (1980) emphasizes the distinct consequences for 
household’s portfolios of “normal” central bank operations, such as open market operations, and helicopter drops of money. 
Section 1.2 picks up this theme. 
  7Although conventional, this regime is not the only mechanism by which monetary and fiscal 
policy can jointly deliver a unique bounded equilibrium. I  now turn to the other polar case. 
 
1.1.2 Passive monetary/active tax policy  
 
Passive tax behavior is a stringent requirement: the tax authority must be willing and able to 
raise taxes in the face of rising government debt. For a variety of reasons, this does not always 
happen, and it certainly does not happen in the automated way prescribed by the tax rule in 
equation (6). Sometimes political factors—such as the desire to seek reelection—prevent taxes from 
rising as needed to stabilize debt.8 Some countries simply do not have the fiscal infrastructure in 
place to generate the necessary tax revenues. Others might be at or near the peak of their Laffer 
curves, suggesting they are close to the fiscal limit. 9  In this case, tax policy is active and 
.  ≤γ< β− 01 / 1
Analogously, there are also periods when the concerns of monetary policy move away from 
inflation stabilization and toward other matters, such as output stabilization or financial crises. 
These are periods in which monetary policy is no longer active, instead adjusting the nominal 
interest rate only weakly in response to inflation. The global recession and financial crisis of 2007–09 
is a striking case in which central banks’ concerns shifted away from inflation. Then monetary policy 
is passive and, in terms of policy rule (5),  ≤ α< β 01 / .10 
I focus on a particular policy mix that yields clean economic interpretations: the nominal interest 
rate is set independently of inflation, α = 0  and 
−− = ≥
1* 1 1 t RR , and taxes are set independently of 
debt,   and . These policy specifications might seem extreme and special, but the 




One result pops out immediately. When the pegged nominal interest rate policy is applied to the 














,   (11) 
 
so expected inflation is anchored on the inflation target, an outcome that is perfectly consistent with 
one aim of inflation-targeting central banks. It turns out, however, that another aim of inflation 
targeters—the stabilization of actual inflation—that can be achieved by active monetary/passive 
fiscal policy, is no longer attainable. 
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and use the government’s flow constraint (equation 3) to solve for the price level: 
 
                                                       
8. Davig and Leeper (2006b, 2009) generalize equation (6) to estimate Markov switching rules for the United States and 
find that tax policy has switched between periods when taxes rise with debt and periods when they do not. 
9. Trabandt and Uhlig (2009) characterize Laffer curves for capital and labor taxes in fourteen European Union countries 
and the United States. They find that some countries (namely, Denmark and Sweden) are on the wrong side of the curve, 
suggesting that those countries must lower tax rates to raise revenues. 
10. Davig and Leeper (2006b, 2009) provide evidence of this for the United States, and Davig and Leeper (2007) study the 






















.   (13) 
 
At time t, the numerator of this expression is predetermined, representing the nominal value of 
household wealth carried into period t. The denominator is the expected present value of primary 
fiscal surpluses from date t on, which is exogenous. So long as   and the present value of 
revenues exceeds the present value of transfers (a condition that must hold if government debt has 
positive value), expression (13) delivers a unique  . 
− >
*
1 0 t RB
> 0 t P
I have done nothing mystical here, despite what some critics claim (for example, Buiter, 2002; 
McCallum, 2001). In particular, the government is not assumed to behave in a manner that violates 
its budget constraint. Unlike competitive households, the government is not required to choose 
sequences of control variables that are consist with its budget constraint for all possible price 
sequences. Indeed, for a central bank to target inflation, it cannot be choosing its policy instrument 
to be consistent with any sequence of the price level; doing so would produce an indeterminate 
equilibrium. Identical reasoning applies to the fiscal authority: the value of a dollar of debt—1/ —
depends on expectations about fiscal decisions in the future; expectations, in turn, are determined by 
the tax rule the fiscal authority announces. The fiscal authority credibly commits to its tax rule, and, 




As remarkable as it may seem, given the solution for the price level in equation (13) to compute 
expected inflation, it is straightforward to show that  + β=
*
1 (/ ) 1 / tt t E PP R , as required by the Fisher 
relation and monetary policy behavior.12 This observation leads to a sharp dichotomy between the 
roles of monetary and fiscal policy in price-level determination: monetary policy alone appears to 
determine expected inflation by choosing the level at which to peg the nominal interest rate, 
− *1 R , 
while conditional on that choice, fiscal variables appear to determine realized inflation. 
To explain the nature of this equilibrium, I need to delve into the underlying economic behavior. 
This is an environment in which changes in debt do not elicit any changes in expected taxes, unlike 
in section 1.1.1. First consider a one-off increase in current transfer payments,  t z , financed by new 
debt issuance, t B . With no offsetting increase in current or expected tax obligations, households feel 
wealthier and try to shift up their consumption paths. Higher demand for goods drives up the price 
level, until the wealth effect dissipates and households are content with their initial consumption 
plan. This is why in expression (24) the value of debt at t changes with expected, but not current, 
transfers. Now imagine that at time t households receive news of higher transfers in the future. 
There is no change in nominal debt at t, but there is still an increase in household wealth. Through 
the same mechanism,  t P  must rise to revalue current debt to be consistent with the new expected 
path of transfers: the value of debt falls in line with the lower expected present value of surpluses. 
                                                       






11. Cochrane (2001) refers to the intertemporal equilibrium condition (IEC), or equation (24), as a debt valuation 
equation and reasons that government debt gets valued analogously to equities. 



















To find expected inflation, simply use the date t – 1 version of equation (13) for  and simplify to obtain  P
t−1








  9Cochrane (2009, p. 5) offers another interpretation of the equilibrium in which “‘aggregate 
demand’ is really just the mirror image of demand for government debt.” An expectation that 
transfers will rise in the future reduces the household’s assessment of the value of government debt. 
Households can shed debt only by converting it into demand for consumption goods, hence the 
increase in aggregate demand that translates into a higher price level.  
Expression (13) highlights that in this policy regime, the impacts of monetary policy change 
dramatically. When the central bank chooses a higher rate at which to peg the nominal interest rate, 
the effect is to raise the price level next period. This echoes Sargent and Wallace (1981), but the 
economic mechanism is different. In the current policy mix, a higher nominal interest rate raises the 
interest payments the household receives on the government bonds it holds. Higher  −
*
1 t R B , with no 
higher anticipated taxes, raises household wealth, triggering the same adjustments as above. In this 
sense, as in Sargent and Wallace, monetary policy has lost control of inflation. 
This section has reviewed existing results on price-level determination under alternative 
monetary-fiscal policy regimes. In each regime the price level is uniquely determined, but the 
impacts of changes in policy differ markedly across the two regimes.  We now apply the notion that 
there is a fiscal limit to create a natural setting that blends the two regimes just considered. 
 
1.2 Model 2  
 
The second model adds a layer of subtlety to the analysis in sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2. The limit to 
the degree of taxation a society will tolerate is modeled by imposing the condition that at some 
known date in the future, T, taxes have reached this maximum allowable level, τ .
max 13 Leading up to 
T, policy is in the active monetary/passive fiscal regime described above, but from date T on, tax 
policy has no option but to become active, with τ =τ
max
t  for t ≥ T. If monetary policy remained active, 
neither authority would stabilize debt, and debt would explode. Existence of equilibrium requires 
that monetary policy switch to being passive, which stabilizes debt.14 Table 1 summarizes the 




Table 1. Monetary-Fiscal Policy Regimes Before and After the Fiscal Limit at Date T 
















,   (14) 
 
where the function for the primary surplus,  t s , changes at the fiscal limit, 
 
                                                       
13. In this model with lump-sum taxes, there is no upper bound for taxes or debt, as long as debt does not grow faster 
than the real interest rate. In a more plausible production economy, in which taxes distort behavior, there would be a natural 
fiscal limit. See Davig, Leeper, and Walker (forthcoming) for further discussion and Bi (2009) for an application of an 
endogenous fiscal limit to the problem of sovereign debt default. 
14. Monetary policy is forced to switch because the fiscal limit is assumed to be an absorbing state. Davig and Leeper 
(2009) display an equilibrium in which active fiscal policy is a recurring state, so that it is feasible for both policies to be active 
simultaneously, as least temporarily. 
  10() −−
= ⎧
⎪τ− γ − − = − ⎨












.   (15) 
 
Expression (14) decomposes the value of government debt at the initial date into the expected 
present value of surpluses leading up to the fiscal limit and the expected present value of surpluses 
after the limit has been hit. 
Evaluating the second part of equation (14) and letting τ =τ






























The first part of equation (14) is a bit messier, as it involves solving for the endogenous taxes that 
are responding to the state of government debt before the fiscal limit is hit. That part of equation 
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Pulling together equations (16) and (17) yields equilibrium real debt at date t = 0 as a function of 
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This expression determines the equilibrium value of debt. The value of debt at t = 0 and, by 
extension, at each date in the future is uniquely determined by parameters describing preferences 
and fiscal behavior and by the exogenous realization of transfers at that date. We arrive at this 
expression by substituting out the endogenous sequence of taxes before the fiscal limit. Apparently 
this economy will not exhibit Ricardian equivalence even if tax policy obeys a rule that raises taxes 
to retire debt back to the steady-state level. This occurs despite the fact that such a tax rule delivers 
Ricardian equivalence in the absence of a fiscal limit, as it did in section 1.1.1. 
Two other implications are immediate. Higher transfers at time 0,  0 z , which portend a higher 
future path of transfers because of their positive serial correlation, reduce the value of debt. This 
occurs for the reasons laid out in section 1.1.2: higher expected government expenditures reduce the 
backing and, therefore, the value of government liabilities. A second immediate implication is more 
  11surprising. How aggressively tax policy responds to debt before hitting the fiscal limit, as 
parameterized by γ, matters for the value of debt. Permanent active monetary/passive tax policies, in 
contrast, produce Ricardian equivalence in this model, so the timing of taxation is irrelevant: how 
rapidly taxes stabilize debt has no bearing on the value of debt. Both of these unusual implications 
are manifestations of the breakdown in Ricardian equivalence that occurs when there is the prospect 
that at some point the economy will hit a fiscal limit, beyond which taxes will no longer adjust to 
finance debt.15 
I now turn to how the equilibrium price level is determined. Given  0 / 0 B P  from equation (18) 
and calling the right side of equation (18)  , use the government’s flow budget constraint at t = 0 
and the fact that 
0 b










.   (19) 
 
Given  , equation (19) yields a unique  . Entire sequences of equilibrium 
tt t are solved recursively: having solved for  00





> 0 0 P
/ {, PR B P  and  0 , obtain  0 P R from the monetary 
policy rule in table 1, and derive the nomimal value of debt. Then use equation (18) redated at t = 1 
to obtain equilibrium  11 / B P  and the government budget constraint at t = 1 to solve for  using 
equation (19) redated at t = 1, and so forth. 
1 P
The equilibrium price level has the same features as it does under the passive monetary/active 
tax regime in section 1.1.2. Higher current or expected transfers, which are not backed in present-
value terms by expected taxes, raise household wealth, increase demand for goods, and drive up the 
price level (reducing the value of debt). A higher pegged nominal interest rate raises nominal 
interest payments, raising wealth and the price level next period. Similarities between this 
equilibrium and that in section 1.1.2 stem from the fact that price-level determination is driven by 
beliefs about policy in the long run. From T on, this economy is identical to the fixed-regime passive 
monetary/active fiscal policies economy and it is beliefs about long-run policies that determine the 
price level. Before the fiscal limit, the two economies are quite different, and the behavior of the price 
level will also be different. 
In this environment where the equilibrium price level is determined entirely by fiscal 
considerations through its interest rate policy, monetary policy determines the expected inflation 
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,   (20) 
 
where monetary policy behaves as table 1 specifies. 
As argued above, the equilibrium price level sequence, 
∞
=0 {} tt P , is determined by versions  of 
equations (18) and (19) for each date t, so equation (20) describes the evolution of expected inflation. 
Given equilibrium   from equation (19) and an arbitrary  0 P −1 P  (arbitrary because the economy starts 
at t = 0 and cannot possibly determine  −1 P , regardless of policy behavior) equation (20) shows that 
00 1 (/) E PP   grows relative to the initial inflation rate. In fact, throughout the active monetary 
                                                       
0
15. This is not to suggest that one cannot concoct Ricardian scenarios. For example, because T  i s  k n o w n ,  i f  t h e  
government were to commit to fully financing the change in the present value of transfers that arises from a shock to z  
before the economy reaches the fiscal limit, one could obtain a Ricardian outcome. But this is driven by the fact that T is 
known. If T were uncertain, as in Davig, Leeper, and Walker (forthcoming), with some probability of occurring at every date, 
even this cooked-up scenario would not produce a Ricardian result. 
  12policy/passive fiscal policy phase, for  = …− 0,1, , 1 tT , expected inflation grows at the rate 
− αβ>
1 1 . 
In periods  , monetary policy pegs the nominal interest rate at  ≥ tT
* R , and expected inflation is 




1)( ) 1 t P R π
* / (/ tt EP
The implications of the equilibrium laid out in equations (18), (19), and (20) for government debt, 
inflation, and the anchoring of expectations on the target values  π
** ) (, b  are most clearly seen in a 
simulation of the equilibrium. Figure 1 contrasts the paths of the debt-to-GDP ratio from two 
models: the fixed passive monetary/active tax regime in section 1.1.2 (dashed line) and the present 
model in which an active monetary/passive tax regime is in place until the economy hits the fiscal 
limit at date T, when policies switch permanently to a passive monetary/active tax combination 
(solid line).16 The fixed regime displays stable fluctuations of real debt around the 50 percent steady-
state debt-to-GDP, which the other model also produces once it hits the fiscal limit. Leading up to 
the fiscal limit, however, it is clear that the active monetary/passive tax policy combination does not 
keep debt near the target. 
 
 
Figure 1. Debt-to-GDP Ratios for a Particular Realization of  
Transfers in Models 1 and 217 
 
 
                                                       
16. Figures 1 through 4 use the following calibration. Leading up to the fiscal limit, α = 1.50 and γ =  0.15. At the limit 
and in the fixed-regime model, α = γ =  0.0. I assume steady-state values τ* = 0.19, z* = 0.17, π* = 1.02  (gross inflation rate), 
and 1/β = 1.04, so that b* = 0.50. The transfer process has ρ = 0.90  and σ = 0.003. Identical realizations of transfers were used 
in all the figures. 
17. Model 1 is the fixed passive monetary/active tax regime described in section 1.1.2 (represented by the dashed line in 
the figure); in model 2, an active monetary/passive tax regime is in place until the economy hits the fiscal limit at date T, 
when policy switches permanently to a passive monetary/active tax combination (solid line). 
  13Expected inflation evolves according to equation (20). Since monetary policy is active leading up 
to the fiscal limit, with α> , there is no tendency for expected inflation to be anchored on the 
inflation target. Figure 2 plots the inflation rate from the fixed-regime model in section 1.1.2 (dashed 
line) and from the present model (solid line), along with expected inflation from the present model 
(dotted dashed line). Inflation in the fixed regime fluctuates around 
β 1/
π
* 1/ , and expected inflation is 
anchored on target, given the pegged nominal interest rate. In the period leading up to the fiscal 
limit, however, the price level is being determined primarily by fluctuations in the real value of debt, 
which deviates wildly from   as shown in figure 1. Expected inflation in that period, though not 
independent of the inflation target, is certainly not anchored by the target. Instead, under active 
monetary policy, the deviation of expected inflation from target grows with the deviation of actual 
inflation from target in the previous period. The figure shows how equation (20) makes expected 





Figure 2. Inflation for a Particular Realization of Transfers in Models 1 and 218 
 
 
The result for periods    is reminiscent of Loyo’s (1999) analysis of Brazilian 
monetary-fiscal interactions in the 1980s. Throughout the 1970s, Brazilian tax policy was active and 
monetary policy was passive. Inflation, interest rates, and primary deficits were stable. In 1980, 
partly in response to pressure from international organizations, Brazilian monetary policy switched 
to being active. Doubly active policies is essentially what is going on in the model above, because the 
=… − 0,1, , 1 tT
                                                       
18. Model 1 is the fixed passive monetary/active tax regime described in section 1.1.2 (represented by the dashed line in 
the figure); in model 2, an active monetary/passive tax regime is in place until the economy hits the fiscal limit at date T, 
when policy switches permanently to a passive monetary/active tax combination (solid line). 
  14knowledge that taxes will hit their limit at time T prevents expected surpluses from that period on 
from adjusting to satisfy the intertemporal equilibrium condition. In Brazil, when monetary policy 
switched to being active, with no corresponding switch to a passive fiscal policy, inflation and 
interest rates began to grow rapidly, even though there was no change in seigniorage revenues. 
Loyo’s analysis reverses the ordering of this model, with passive monetary/active fiscal policy before 
T, and doubly active policies after. 
To underscore the extent to which inflation is unhinged from monetary policy, even in the active 
monetary/passive tax regime before the fiscal limit, suppose that tax policy reacts more aggressively 
to debt. A higher value of γ in equation (6) can have unexpected consequences. Expression (18) makes 
clear that raising γ, which in a fixed active monetary/passive tax regime would stabilize debt more 
quickly, amplifies  the effects of transfer shocks on debt. A more volatile value of debt, in turn, 
translates into more volatile actual and expected inflation.  
Figures 3 and 4 show this result by repeating the previous figures, but with a passive tax policy 
that responds more strongly to debt (γ is raised from 0.10 to 0.15). Figures 3 and 4 also illustrate a 
general phenomenon: as the economy approaches the fiscal limit at time T, the equilibrium with 
different tax policies converge. As also shown in figures 1 and 2, as time approaches T, the 
equilibrium also converges to the fixed-regime economy. 
 
 




                                                       
19. The figure presents the fixed passive monetary/active fiscal regime described in section 1.1.2 (model 1, represented by 
the dashed line in the figure), plus two settings of tax policy before the economy hits the fiscal limit at date T under an active 
monetary/passive fiscal regime (model 2): a weaker response of taxes to debt (γ = 0.15, represented by the solid line) and a 
stronger response of taxes to debt (γ = 0.17 , represented by the dotted dashed line). 
  15 
Figure 4. Inflation for Two Settings of Tax Policy20 
 
 
An analogous exercise for monetary policy illustrates its impotence when there is a fiscal limit. A 
more hawkish monetary policy stance, represented by a higher α in equation (5), has no effect 
whatsoever on the value of debt and inflation: α does not appear in expression (18) for real debt or in 
expression (19) for the price level. More hawkish monetary policy does, however, amplify the 
volatility of expected inflation, as the evolution of expected inflation in equation (20) shows. 
Because monetary policy loses control of inflation after the fiscal limit is reached, forward-
looking behavior implies that it also loses control of inflation before the fiscal limit is hit. By 
extension, changes in fiscal behavior in the period leading up to the limit affects both the equilibrium 
inflation process and the process for expected inflation. 
 
1.3 Model 3  
 
The two models presented above contain no uncertainty about future policy regime, making the 
rather implausible—though extremely common—assumption that agents know exactly what 
monetary and fiscal policies will be in effect at every date in the future. Although this assumption is 
maintained in nearly all macroeconomic studies, it is difficult to reconcile the assumption with 
observed policy behavior. In fact, policies do change, and therefore they can change. In the face of a 
history of changes in policy regimes, analyses that fail to incorporate the possibility of regime change 
                                                       
20. The figure presents actual inflation in the fixed passive monetary/active fiscal regime described in section 1.1.2 
(model 1, represented by the dashed line in the figure), plus expected inflation under two settings of tax policy before the 
economy hits the fiscal limit at date T under an active monetary/passive fiscal regime (model 2): a weaker response of taxes to 
debt (γ = 0.15, represented by the solid line) and a stronger response of taxes to debt (γ = 0.17 , represented by the dotted 
dashed line).  
 
  16into expectations formation run the risk of misspecifying expectations and providing misleading 
policy advice.21 Given the prominent role ascribed to expectations formation in policy discussions and 
deliberations, this is a potentially serious misspecification of policy models. 
I introduce uncertainty about policy in a stark fashion that allows me to extract some 
implications of policy uncertainty while retaining analytical tractability. The economy continues to 
hit the fiscal limit at a known date T, at which point taxes become active, setting τ=  for all 
. Uncertainty arises because at the limit agents place a probability q on a regime that combines 
passive monetary policy with active transfer policy and a probability 1 – q on a regime with active 






22 To avoid the tangle of euphemisms, I refer to this as reneging on promised 
transfers. Instead of receiving promised transfers of  at time t, agents receive λ , with  t z tt z λ ∈ t
tt z
[0,1], 
so   is the fraction of promised transfers that the government honors. Budget constraints for the 
household and the government, equations (2) and (3), are modified to replace   with λ . 
λt
t z
Aging populations in many countries represent a looming fiscal crisis that offers a practical 
motivation for considering the possibility that governments may not honor their promises. Some 
countries—including Australia, Chile, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden—are preparing for the 
demographic shifts through the creation of superannuation funds or the adoption of fiscal rules that 
aim to have surpluses that can be saved to meet future government obligations. Other countries—
such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are entering the period of enhanced 
fiscal stress unprepared. In both sets of countries, there is uncertainty about exactly how the 
government will finance its obligations, but in the unprepared countries, government reneging on 
promised transfers is a real possibility. This possibility potentially has important impacts on 
expectations formation and economic decisions today. 
For simplicity I reduce the previous models to just four periods. In the initial two periods 
( ), the fiscal limit has not been reached, promised transfers follow the process in equation (7), 
monetary policy is active, and tax policy is passive. The economy begins with  −−  given and 
some arbitrary  −1 P . This is equivalent to the time period 
= 0,1 t
> 110 RB
= …− 0, , 1 tT   in section 1.2. At the 
beginning of period two ( ), the fiscal limit is reached, but agents remain uncertain about which 
mix of policies will be adopted. This uncertainty is resolved at the end of period 2. In period 3, there 
is no uncertainty about policy, so period 3 is completely analogous to section 1.2 for  . 
= 2 t
= , tT + 1 , T …
Combining the Fisher relation (equation 4) with the active monetary policy rule (equation 5) for 
periods 0 and 1 yields 
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21. This is the theme of Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon (1982, 1984), Sims (1982, 1987), Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), 
Leeper and Zha (2003), Davig (2004), Davig and Leeper (2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2009), Chung, Davig, and Leeper (2007), and 
Davig, Leeper, and Walker (forthcoming). 
22. To quote the New York Times, “Just about everybody agrees that solving the deficit depends on reducing the benefits 
that current law has promised to retirees, via Medicare and Social Security. That’s not how people usually put it, of course. 
They tend to use the more soothing phrase ‘entitlement reform.’ But entitlement reform is just another way of saying that we 
can’t pay more in benefits than we collect in taxes” (D. Leonhardt, “A Drop in the Wrong Bucket,” New York Times, 29 
October 2009. 
  17 
Agents know that the fiscal limit will be reached in the next period ( = 2 t )and policy will switch 
to either a passive monetary/active transfer regime with probability q or an active monetary/passive 
transfer regime with probability ( ). Assume that the reneging rate is fixed and known at  − 1 q = 0 t , 
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1 * .   (24) 
 
In equation (24), to make the relationships transparent, I have imposed that τ , the steady-
state level of taxes. 
= τ
max *
In period 3,   is set to completely retire debt ( τ3 = 3 0 B
2 3 ) / P
) no matter which policy regime is realized 
in period 2. This corresponds to τ= , where  δ + 332 ( zR B δ =1  if the economy is in the passive 
monetary/active transfer regime and δ =λ  if the active monetary/passive transfer regime is 
realized. This assumption implies that agents know one period in advance which tax policy will be in 
place in the final period. 
Combining equations (21) and (23) yields a relationship between expected inflation between 
periods 2 and 3 and actual inflation in the initial period 
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Given the discount rate β, this solution for expected inflation shows that whether expected inflation 
converges to target or drifts from target depends on the probability of switching to passive 
monetary/active transfer policies relative to how hawkishly monetary policy targets inflation when it 
is active. For the deviation of expected inflation from target to be smaller than the deviation of 
actual inflation from target in period  = 0 ,  t  is necessary that  > 1 q  longer the period 
leading up to the fiscal limit, the larger must q be to ensure that equation (25) is stable. It may seem 
paradoxical, but the more hawkish is policy—the larger is 
it  The − βα
3 (/) .
α —the grea er must be the probability 
that monetary policy will be passive (dovish?) in the future in order for the evolution of expected 
inflation to be stable. Resolution of this paradox comes from recognizing that when  =1 q , such t 





ereas when  = 0 q h that transfer policy is known to be passive at the limit, then equation (25) 
yields equilibrium inflation, just as in section 1.1.1. 
wh  s , uc
  18Since we assume that taxes in period 3 are known, and they are a function of exogenous objects, 
we can treat  as fixed. Combining equations (22) and (24) and imposing that  , as is the debt 
target in the last period, 
τ3 = 3 0 B
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where ϑ=  determines expected post-reneging transfers.  + − λ (1 ) qq
Equation (26) uniquely determines the value of debt in period 0 as a function of the expected 
present value of surpluses. We can combine equation (26) with the government’s flow constraint at 
 to obtain a unique expression for   as a function of  = 0 t 0 P − − 11 R B , τ0 ,  , and the parameters in 
the expression for equilibrium 
0 z
00 / B P . 
The solution in equation (26) leads to the following inferences. As  —the probability of 
switching to the passive monetary/active transfer regime—rises, the value of debt at 0 falls, and   
rises. In addition, as  —the fraction of transfers on which the government reneges in periods 2 and 
3—falls, the value of debt at 0 falls, and the price level rises. Both of the consequences for  0  operate 
through standard fiscal theory wealth effects. Higher q  means that the government is less likely to 
renege, so expected transfers and, therefore, household wealth rise. Households attempt to convert 
the higher wealth into consumption goods, driving up the price level until real wealth falls 
sufficiently that they are content to consume their original consumption place. Lower λ  also raises 





Expectational effects associated with switching policies can be seen explicitly in equations (25) 
and (26). Equation (26) shows that the value of debt is still determined by the discounted expected 
value of net surpluses. In contrast to the previous models without uncertainty about future policies, 
now the actual surplus is conditional on the realized policy regime. Conditional on information at 
time  , the expected transfers process in periods 2 and 3 is unknown. If    and at the end 
of period 2 passive monetary policy is realized, agents will be surprised by amount   in 
period 2 and by amount   in period 3. With transfers surprisingly high—because the 
passive transfer regime with reneging was not realized—households feel wealthier and try to convert 
that wealth into consumption. This drives up the price level in periods 2 and 3, revaluing debt 
d o w n w a r d .  T h i s  s u r p r i s e  a c t s  a s  a n  i n n o v a t i o n  to the agent’s information set due to policy 
uncertainty. Naturally, as agents put a high probability on this regime occurring   or assume 
that the amount of reneging is small 
= 0 t ∈(0,1) q
2(1
≈ ( q
−− λ )(1 ) zq
1 )
−− λ 3(1 )(1 ) zq
λ λ≈ ,3    1 ) (2 , the surprise is also small, and vice versa. 
Comparing equations (25) with (20), expected inflation in period 1 now depends on q , which 
summarizes beliefs about future policies. But   is a parameter of both monetary and transfer policy. 
The previous model demonstrated that monetary policy alone cannot determine the price level. With 
policy uncertainty, monetary policy alone also cannot determine expected inflation. If agents put a 
high probability on the passive monetary/active transfer regime 
q
≈ (1 q ) , then expected inflation at 
the beginning of period 2 will be primarily pinned down by the nominal peg. It is in this sense that 
expectational effects about policy uncertainty can dramatically alter equilibrium outcomes. 
In this simple setup, these expectational effects are limited in magnitude because agents know 
precisely when the fiscal limit is reached. The additional level of uncertainty not examined in these 
simple models, but present in Davig, Leeper, and Walker (forthcoming), is randomness in when tax 
policy will hit the fiscal limit. In that environment, the conditional probability of switching policies 
outlined above would contain an additional term specifying the conditional probability of hitting the 
fiscal limit in that period. This implies that, because there is a positive probability of hitting the 
fiscal limit in every period up to T , these expectational effects will be present from  and  =… 0, , tT
  19will gradually become more important as the probability of hitting the fiscal limit increases. In 
effect, the endogenous probability of hitting the fiscal limit makes the probability q time varying. 
 
1.4 Summary  
 
The models presented above severely understate the degree of uncertainty about future policies 
that private agents face in actual economies. To derive a rational expectations equilibrium, I have 
taken stands on the stochastic structure of the economy that are difficult to reconcile with 
observations about any actual policy environment.23 Remarkably, the models show that even in a 
setting that drastically understates the actual degree of uncertainty, private expectations of 
monetary and fiscal objectives are not well anchored on the targets of policy. These models also make 
clear that in an economy that faces heightened fiscal stress, the monetary policy behavior that most 
economists regard as “good” cannot control either actual or expected inflation. “Good” monetary 
policy can actually exaggerate the swings in expected inflation. 
 
 
2. POLICY INSTITUTIONS AND FUTURE POLICIES 
 
This section examines monetary and fiscal policy arrangements in Chile and the United States to 
draw some inferences about how the theoretical points derived above might play out in those 
economies. Chile and the United States offer interesting contrasts. Whereas Chile has adopted 
specific objectives and even rules for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy, the United States has 
eschewed rules-based policies. The Central Bank of Chile is guided by an explicit inflation target; the 
Federal Reserve operates under a multiple mandate. Chile has adopted a series of fiscal rules, 
designed in part to provide for its aging population; the United States has done nothing except 
implement short-run fiscal policies that are projected to double the outstanding debt over the next 
decade. For the theme of this paper—how macroeconomic policies do or do not anchor expectations—
the contrast is particularly relevant. 
 
2.1 The United States 
 
Even in normal times, the multiple objectives that guide Federal Reserve decisions and the 
absence of any mandates to guide federal tax and spending policies conspire to make it very difficult 
for private agents to form expectations of U.S. monetary and fiscal policies.24 
In the United States, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) regularly publishes projections of 
the country’s long-run fiscal situation. In the wake of the financial crisis and recession of 2007–09, 
monetary and fiscal policies have not been normal and, in the absence of dramatic policy changes, 
policies are unlikely to return to normalcy for generations to come, as long-term projections by the 
CBO make plain. Figure 5 reports actual and projected federal transfers due to Social Security, 
Medicaid, and Medicare as a percentage of GDP (CBO, 2009). Demographic shifts and rising relative 
costs of health care combine to grow these transfers from under 10 percent of GDP today to about 25 
percent in 70 years. One much-discussed consequence of this growth is shown in figure 6, which plots 
actual and projected federal government debt as a share of GDP from 1790 to 2083. Relative to the 
future, the debt run-ups associated with the Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Reagan 
deficits, and the current fiscal stimulus are mere hiccups. 
 
                                                       
23. Sargent (2006) acknowledges this and goes so far as to say that U.S. monetary and fiscal policies are marked by 
“ambiguity or Knightian uncertainty,” which precludes the specificity about stochastic structure assumed in the models of 
section 1. 
24. This section draws heavily on Leeper (2009) and Davig, Leeper, and Walker (forthcoming). 
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Figure 5. Projected and Actual Federal Expenditures Decomposed into Medicare, Medicaid, and 









                                                       
25. The solid line represents actual and projected revenues under the extended-baseline scenario, which assumes current 
law does not change. Source: CBO (2009). 
26. The extended-baseline scenario assumes that current law does not change, while  the alternative fiscal financing 
scenario allows for “policy changes that are widely expected to occur and that policymakers have regularly made in the past,” 
according to the CBO. Source: CBO (2009). 
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w exponentially in these countries. Second, the maintained assumptions—which produced the 
exploding debt paths—cannot possibly hold. We learn the second point from the intertemporal 
equilibrium condition. Figure 6 implies that within our children’s lifetimes, U.S. debt will exceed the 
fiscal limit, violating the intertemporal equilibrium condition. 27  These projections are public 
information and well understood by investors who continue to buy these government bonds without 
demanding a risk premium. Why do they continue to buy bonds? Because their expectations of future 
policy adjustments are at odds with the projections’ maintained assumptions. In sum, figures of 
exploding debt paths, which fiscal authorities around the world routinely publish, arise from 
economic behavior that is not happening and which flies in the face of basic economic logic. 
Projections of things that cannot happen cannot help to anchor expectations. 
Having the future inherit larger government debt is problematic for 
her debt entails higher debt service, and more government expenditures must be devoted to 
paying interest on outstanding debt. Historically, countries have found that higher debt service 
crowds out other forms of government expenditures. Second, as the intertemporal equilibrium 
condition implies, higher debt requires higher present-value surpluses. That present value is 
bounded, however: as a share of GDP, tax revenues have some maximum level and spending has 
some minimum level. At those levels, the natural fiscal limit is reached and the economy cannot 
support a value of debt higher than that limit. By pushing more debt into the future, current policies 
move debt closer to the fiscal limit, which places restrictions on fiscal flexibility in the future. But 
the future is when the fiscal consequences of aging populations come home to roost; it is precisely 
when fiscal flexibility is most needed. 
Additional reasons that higher de
els of interest payments require larger future fiscal adjustments. If the public is uncertain about 
the hows and whys of those adjustments, the macroeconomic consequences of the move to higher 
debt will be difficult to predict. But there is another more fundamental issue. In countries without 
guidelines governing debt levels, large debt run-ups leave unanswered a question that is critical to 
the public’s formation of expectations: will the economy settle in at the new, higher level of debt, or 
will policy endeavor to retire debt back to its previous level or some other level? The answer to this 
question is central to the public’s ability to form reasonable fiscal expectations. 
And what of Federal Reserve policy? Many observers believe that U
formance improved dramatically with the appointment of Chairman Paul Volcker in 1979 and 
continued to be good at least until the most recent period (Taylor, 1999a; Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 
1999). The appointment of a sequence of good Federal Reserve chairmen, however, has been largely a 
matter of luck, rather than a reflection of institutional reform. This institutional reality is 
underscored by the fact that the particular Fed chairman plays such a large role in the outcome of 





target a three percent inflation rate (plus or minus a percentage point) and the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law.28 The Basic Constitutional Act of the Central Bank of Chile, passed in 1989, 
granted the central bank full independence and prescribed price stability and smooth functioning of 
the payments systems as its objectives. A formal inflation target was adopted in 2007, with the aim 
of hitting three percent inflation “in a medium-term horizon of two years.” As with many inflation-
targeting central banks, along with the explicit target came enhanced transparency and an emphasis 
on communication with the public. 
 
27. The U.S. fiscal limit is unknown, but I imagine it implies something less than a 300 percent debt-GDP ratio. 
28. This section draws on several sources, including Perry, Servén, and Suescún (2008), Singh and others (2005), 
Rodríguez, Tokman, and Vega (2007), Marshall (2003), Central Bank of Chile (2007), Velasco (2008), and IMF (2009). 
  22Although many countries adopted inflation targeting without also implementing a compatible 
fiscal framework, Chile has been at the vanguard of countries that have reformed their monetary 
and fiscal policy institutions jointly. Chilean fiscal policy has been guided by a structural surplus 
rule since 2000, and the rule was given some legal teeth by the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility 
Law in August 2006. In the beginning, the ruled aimed for a structural surplus of 1 percent of GDP. 
But the target itself is state dependent: it was changed to 0.5 percent in 2008 and again in January 
2009, explicitly temporarily, with the aim of balancing the budget. 
Like many Latin American countries, Chilean fiscal policy was strongly procyclical, which 
exacerbated cyclical fluctuations.29 The structural balance methodology and the associated surplus 
rule were designed to counter the procyclicality, among several other key goals. To arrive at the 
structural surplus, the government estimates what revenues it would receive if the economy were 
growing at trend and if the prices of copper and molybdenum were at their long-run levels.30 For the 
first six years, the aim of the surplus was to accumulate assets that could be used to meet future 
government obligations, particularly guaranteed minimum pensions and old-age transfer payments. 
The benefits from the adoption of the structural surplus rule have been remarkable. Some key 
benefits include the following: 
—Chilean fiscal policy has been freed to behave countercyclically; 
—Government debt and interest payments on debt fell throughout the 2000s, with gross central 
debt down to 5 percent of GDP in 2008; 
—A Pension Reserve Fund was established, in which assets are invested, just as in private 
pension funds, and accumulated to meet future obligations;31 
—Sovereign debt interest-rate spreads for Chile are now well below those of other emerging 
economies and did not rise after 9/11 or the Argentine crisis of 2002, when other countries’ spread 
rose sharply; the decline in Chilean spreads began with the adoption of the structural balance policy; 
and 
—Declining sovereign debt risk spreads speak directly to the improved prospects for 
sustainability of Chile’s fiscal policies. 
The last two points are pertinent to the paper’s theme of anchoring expectations and therefore 
deserve elaboration.32 Small open economies are susceptible to large external shocks that make the 
economies highly volatile. This tendency is still more pronounced in economies, like Chile, that are 
strongly affected by fluctuations in commodity prices. Bi (2009) shows theoretically that default risk 
premiums emerge from the market’s expectations about a country’s ability and willingness to service 
its debt. Ability arises endogenously from the country’s stochastic fiscal limit, which is tied to the 
peak of the country’s Laffer curve. The probability distribution of the fiscal limit depends on teh 
persistence and volatility of technology shocks, the size of the government, the degree of 
countercyclicality of fiscal policies, and the impatience of political decisionmakers. Volatile economies 
tend to have highly dispersed distributions for the fiscal limit, which increase the probability of 
default at any given debt-to-GDP ratio; countries with large government transfer programs have 
fiscal limits with lower means; impatient political leaders reduce the mean of the limit. 
A country’s willingness to service debt is driven by the flexibility of its fiscal policy. Flexible 
policy implies a willingness to raise taxes or lower government expenditures in the face of debt run-
ups. A country that is operating well below its fiscal limit and is willing to adjust surpluses to 
stabilize debt can successfully steer its way through economic downturns without incurring the 
wrath of financial markets in the form of risk premiums. 
Viewed in the context of fiscal limits, Chile’s structural balance rule and related innovations 
stemming from Fiscal Responsibility Law serve to move Chile’s government debt position farther 
from the fiscal limit. Greater distance from the limit arises from both reducing government debt 
                                                       
29. Procyclicality and its consequences are documented in Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh 
(2004). 
30. Batini, Levine, and Pearlman (2009) and Kumhof and Laxton (2009) assess the performance of such a rule in dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models. 
31. Several countries have similar funds. Norway has created a large sovereign wealth fund from oil revenues; Australia 
and New Zealand have superannuation funds. 
32. This discussion is based on the insightful study of fiscal limits and sovereign debt risk premiums by Bi (2009). 
  23today and effectively shifting the distribution of the limit up to higher debt-to-GDP levels. Shifts in 
the distribution of the fiscal limit come from forcing a longer-term perspective on fiscal decisions and 
creating reserves that can be tapped in the future to finance benefits to the aging population. In this 
sense, the structural balance rule contributes in important ways to anchoring expectations on 
sustainable policies that are well cushioned away from Chile’s fiscal limit. 
As the theory in this paper implies, so long as the probability of hitting the fiscal limit in Chile is 
remote, there is every reason to believe that the Central Bank of Chile’s efforts at inflation targeting 
will continue to be successful. 
 
 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Many countries are entering an extended period of relentless growth in transfer payments 
promised to their aging populations. Some, but not all, of these countries ultimately are relying on a 
pay-as-you-go scheme for financing these expenditures. If there is a level of taxation that, for 
economic or political reasons, those economies cannot exceed, then the pay-as-you-go scheme is 
unsustainable. 
As Herb Stein famously said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” Stein also pointed 
out that although economists are good at pointing out when something cannot persist indefinitely, 
they are less adept at predicting when it will stop. This is true enough in the present context, but we 
can say something constructive. Economic agents’ beliefs about when the economy will reach its 
fiscal limit and how policies will adjust after the limit will feed back to affect the equilibrium we 
observe today, before the limit is reached. Predicting when an economy will hit its fiscal limit is less 
important for policymaking than is the systematic analysis of the possible existence of such a limit 
and all that that implies about expectations and macroeconomic policy effects. 
For policymakers, the feedback from beliefs about the limit to the current equilibrium should be 
disturbing. Because pre-limit economic decisions depend, in part, on beliefs about post-limit policy 
behavior, accurate predictions of the impacts of policy changes today rely on understanding to what 
those beliefs are anchored. Coherent monetary-fiscal frameworks can help to anchor those beliefs. 
Incoherent frameworks can actually make beliefs even more untethered. 
Countries can guard against this eventuality by implementing monetary-fiscal frameworks that 
keep their debt-to-GDP ratios well away from their fiscal limits.33 However, fiscal limits are country 
specific and depend on myriad things that characterize a country’s political-economic environment. 
No one-size-fits-all policy framework will work across a highly diverse set of countries. 
Chile has instituted a monetary-fiscal framework that, at least for now, appears to be moving the 
c o u n t r y  f a r t h e r  f r o m  i t s  f i s c a l  l i m i t .  W i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  d i s t a n c e  f r o m  t h a t  l i m i t ,  t h e r e  i s  r e a s o n  t o  
believe that the Central Bank of Chile’s pursuit of inflation targeting can successfully anchor actual 
and expected inflation. Progress has been far slower—or even nonexistent—in many larger 
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